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Abstract
In this paper, we study the eﬀectiveness of environmental information
disclosure as a regulatory instrument. In particular we analyze its impact
when environmental regulation is already advanced. Using German stock
market data, we are able to identify the impact of the European Pollutant
Emission Register (EPER) on the market value of listed ﬁrms using a Mul-
tivariate Regression Model (MVRM). First, we show that the publication of
EPER data leads to negative abnormal returns of the respective listed ﬁrms
in Germany. Second, we study drivers of these abnormal returns. Here, we
ﬁnd that the ﬁrms' individual level of non-carbon emissions can explain the
observed changes in market valuation, while carbon dioxide emissions do not
seem to be punished by the market. Moreover, we include information on
voluntarily provided environmental reports and ﬁnd that these reports can
serve as a substitute to the obligatory register.
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1 Introduction
Disclosure of environmental information is an increasingly popular instrument of
regulation throughout the world. Recent studies (e.g. Hibiki and Managi, 2011,
2010; Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson, 2008) have started to
analyze the impact of Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs) outside
the US, its country of origin. The idea to use information disclosure as a regulatory
approach stems from the Anglo-Saxon political tradition of the freedom of infor-
mation. With the implementation of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in 1989,
which provides site-level data on emissions, this idea became a new paradigm in
environmental regulation (Sunstein, 1999) and led Tietenberg (1998) to classify it
as the third wave of environmental regulation, adding to the previously prevailing
concepts of command and control and market-based instruments. As the ﬁrms'
polluting behavior is generally unknown to the public, the obligation to disclose
information aims at reducing information asymmetry in the market, thereby in-
creasing eﬃciency. In particular, the publication also addresses the gap between
corporate reporting and stakeholder demands (Gouldson and Sullivan, 2007).
The TRI is thought to be causal for a reduction in US-American emissions of
45 percent (Koehler and Spengler, 2007). Moreover, Hamilton (1995) and Khanna,
Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) ﬁnd that capital markets show a signiﬁcant reaction to
the TRI publications leading to the view that. (Konar and Cohen, 1997) ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with large stock price decline subsequently reduced emissions and conclude
that the TRI is an eﬀective measure. As a consequence, today, this approach en-
joys great popularity across the world. Also in Europe, a similar platform has been
installed: On February 23, 2004, the ﬁrst data of the European Pollutant Emission
Register (EPER) was released to the public. While most empirical studies focus on
the US-American TRI, we provide one of the ﬁrst analyses of the eﬀectiveness of
transparency as a regulatory instrument in continental Europe. This is of partic-
ular interest, as the importance of environmental protection is much more present
in the German society in the 21st century as opposed to its US-American counter-
∗This paper is part of the project INFINUM (informed citizens as an instrument of environ-
mental regulation). We gratefully acknowledge funding by the German Ministry of Education
and Research. We are grateful for inspiring discussions and helpful comments by Timo Goeschl
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part in the late 1980s. In 1989, when the TRI was implemented, the environmental
regulatory system was in an early stage of its development allowing the TRI to
ﬁll an important gap (Kraft, Stephen, and Abel, 2011). In contrast to this, at the
beginning of the 2000s, when the EPER was put into operation, the regulatory
system was generally much more developed, particularly in Germany. According
to the GDP per capita weighted Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI),
Germany was ranked among the top ﬁve high-income countries (GDP per capita ≥
$35,000) whereas the US occupied the bottom rung. Hence, our data allows us to
answer the question, to what extent the provision of information remains a pow-
erful regulatory tool in the context of a stronger regulatory framework. Does such
a setting induce stronger reactions to the provided information (due to stronger
preferences for a clean environment reﬂected by the stronger regulation) or are
market reactions weaker (as there is less value added in an already well-informed
public)?
We base our analyses on the ﬁrst two EPER waves (2001 and 2004). Applying
an event study approach based on a Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM), we
show that ﬁrms listed in the EPER loose market value in both years after the
publication. We then run a large set of estimations to identify drivers of the ob-
served devaluation. Our results show that market reactions can be explained by
the reported emission levels if ﬁrms do not provide environmental reports - and
when excluding carbon dioxide.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the related literature. Section 3 describes the data set and provides the empirical
speciﬁcation as well as the research hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results of our
analyses including some robustness checks. In Section 5 we discuss the conclude.
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2 Related Literature
2.1 Disclosure of environmental information as a regulatory
instrument
Since environmental pollution was identiﬁed as a negative external eﬀect, ideas
have been suggested to recover eﬃciency. The regulation of polluting emissions
can be grouped into three categories: command and control instruments, market-
based instruments and information disclosure strategies. The classic command
and control approach uses quantitative restrictions (e.g. emission limits or tech-
nological standards) in combination with ﬁnes for non-compliers. From a current
point of view of environmental economics these instruments should be seen skep-
tical. Tietenberg (1998) points out that this results mainly from their ineﬃciency
and ineﬀectiveness regarding costs. With respect to economic aspects market-
based instruments are favorable. Here, only qualitative goals are determined by
the regulator, but not how to achieve these. Market signals induce the regulatory
outcome (e.g. emissions trading).
The third wave is characterized by quasi-regulatory instruments. Tietenberg
(1998) deﬁnes environmental disclosure strategies as public and/or private at-
tempts to increase the availability of information on pollution to workers, con-
sumers, shareholders and the public at large. This form of regulation tries to
regulate through non-traditional players (e.g. the public opinion). Information
disclosure strategies can substitute classic instruments of regulation as well as be
used simultaneously.
In the absence of traditional regulation, information disclosure shall create
market-based incentives for better ecological performance. Through these mar-
ket forces the aﬀected economic subjects shall self-regulate their pollution level
in a way traditional regulation cannot achieve. According to Delgado-Ceballos,
Kassinis, and Aragon-Correa (2009), pressure on polluting ﬁrms shall be created
by diﬀerent stakeholders, such as investors, consumers and Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs), which are provided with the emission information of each
facility and ﬁrm.
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2.2 Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers
A Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) is deﬁned by the OECD (2001,
p.12) as a database or register of chemicals released to air, water and land, and
wastes transferred oﬀ-site. Based on a list of priority chemicals, facilities that
released one or more of the listed chemicals report periodically - usually annually
- on the amount of released and/or transferred and to which environmental media.
Reported data are then made available to the public. On a more abstract level, the
goals of PRTRs are the promotion of the right-to-know premise, the monitoring of
environmental policy as well as the support of the reduction of emissions and risks
(Kerret and Gray, 2007). According to Tietenberg (1998), there are four functions
a PRTR has to incorporate. PRTRs shall help to detect environmental risks and
collect reliable information about them. Furthermore, this information has to be
disseminated to those who are exposed to the risks of the pollution. Additionally
these private or public agents have to have the possibility to use the information to
put pressure on the emitting subjects. Blackman, Afsah, and Ratunanda (2004)
propose a ﬁfth element on the basis of their empirical analysis. This element is the
information distribution to the polluter itself. This could create an audit eﬀect
and shed light on previously unknown room for improvement.
One important fact for the regulator is that information disclosure programs
are generally thought to cost less than other regulatory instruments, especially
since new information technologies (both hardware and software) facilitate the
dissemination of environmental information. Furthermore, information disclosure
programs serve an important social function - as they satisfy the right-to-know
paradigm with respect to third-party pollution - making them politically more
acceptable. As a consequence, in more and more countries information disclosure
strategies are applied as environmental regulation.
2.2.1 US-American TRI
The best-known PRTR is the TRI, which was implemented in the USA at the end
of the 1980s. The legal foundation of the TRI is the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995). The
US Congress passed the law as a consequence of the environmental catastrophe
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of Bhopal, India. This catastrophe had fatal eﬀects of both the environment and
population. Due to the EPRCA all industrial facilities needed to report annually
about release and transfer of over 320 chemicals.
Cohen (2001) states that the TRI program led to a signiﬁcant voluntary de-
crease in the total amount of TRI-listed chemicals released in the USA. According
to their estimations, the total on- and oﬀ-site releases and transports between the
years 1988 and 1999 were reduced by 45 percent.1 However, one has to bear in
mind, that the reduction of toxic releases is not connected with a reduction of
the production of toxics, but instead with a development towards the recycling of
these substances (Dasgupta, Wang, and Wheeler, 2006). Therefore it cannot be
concluded that a conversion to safer or less harmful toxics was realized. Neverthe-
less, the TRI is widely viewed as a success and has been copied throughout the
world.
Kerret and Gray (2007) compare emissions reductions after the implementation
of the TRI in diﬀerent commonwealth countries. They ﬁnd that in no other country
such signiﬁcant and constant emission reductions could be realized as in the US.
According to Kerret and Gray, this can be explained by diﬀerent characteristics
as well as by diﬀering prerequisites in the countries. However, we can think of
an alternative explanation. The impact might also be reduced due to improved
environmental regulation by the time the PRTRs were installed outside the US.
2.2.2 European Pollutant Emission Register
The basis for the public access to pollution registers in Europe is the European
Council Directive 96/61/EC, concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol (IPPC) (Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson, 2008). In this
directive there are basic requirements deﬁned which industrial and agricultural
facilities have to meet. Goal of this directive is the achievement of a high envi-
ronmental level in the European Union. Companies are also obliged to disclose
information about their emissions in the European Pollutant Emission Register
(EPER). The ﬁnal Decision 2000/479/EC by the Commission was made on July
17, 2000.
1Originating in the TRI, additional voluntary emission reduction programs were imple-
mented, such as the 33/50-program.
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Every three years, the EPER publishes new information on the releases of 50
chemicals, which are divided into ﬁve categories: Environmental themes, met-
als and compounds, chlorinated organic substances, other organic compounds
and other compounds. Out of these 50 chemicals 37 are air and 26 are water
emissions. The disclosure of the pollution data requires the excess of speciﬁc
thresholds. But these thresholds do not represent emission limits whose viola-
tion will be ﬁned. The German emission data for 2001 and 2004 are available at
http://www.home.eper.de.2 According to the ? this website shall give all stake-
holders the possibility to browse and use the register. But not all industrial fa-
cilities have the duty to report their emissions. Only the facilities which perform
activities of annex 1 of the IPPC-Directive are integrated. There are 56 activities
reported in the EPER, which are divided in six categories (Energy industry, Pro-
duction and processing metals, Mineral industry, Chemical industry and chemical
installations, Waste management, Other activities).
2.3 Previous research
Diﬀerent studies have analyzed the reactions of the (ﬁnancial) market to the dis-
closure of environmental information. Most of them used data from the US.
The study of Hamilton (1995) represents the ﬁrst analysis of the eﬀectiveness
of environmental information disclosure as a regulatory instrument. The study
considers 436 ﬁrms listed on the stock exchange. At the day of publication of the
TRI data from the year 1987 on June 19, 1989, Hamilton identiﬁes a signiﬁcant
average abnormal return of -0.3 percent. In monetary terms, the loss was $4,1
million per ﬁrm. Furthermore, Hamilton ﬁnds that the higher the emissions of
each company the more probable is the publication of articles in print media.
Hence, he ﬁnds evidence that the released information is indeed news to investors
and journalists. Put diﬀerently, the hypothesis can be accepted, that the TRI
functions as a source of environmental information for economic markets.
Synthesizing Hamilton's work, Konar and Cohen (1997) examine, if negative
returns, connected to the publication of the TRI data, are related to the emission
2In 2007, EPER was replaced by the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register
(E-PRTR).
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reductions of the concerning ﬁrms. Hence, they test whether behavioral changes
can be observed as reaction to the disclosed information. Konar and Cohen ﬁnd
that the companies with the highest negative abnormal returns subsequently re-
duced their TRI emissions more than other ﬁrms in their respective industries
(including ﬁrms with the highest level of revenue weighted TRI emissions). They
can also show that these ﬁrms had a lower likelihood of receiving large ﬁnes from
the government in subsequent years. Summarizing, the study of Konar and Cohen
strengthens the hypothesis, that the pressure of ﬁnancial markets is an incentive
for ﬁrms to increase their environmental performance.
Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) study the long-term eﬀectiveness of the
TRI. In particular, they investigate the eﬀect of repeated disclosure of environmen-
tal information, looking at ﬁrms from the chemical industry over a period of six
years (1989 - 1994). In their sample, abnormal returns are insigniﬁcant in the ﬁst
reporting year (1987) and signiﬁcant in the subsequent years. Moreover, they ﬁnd
that the decrease of environmental performance was followed by statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative abnormal returns at the stock market. These abnormal negative
returns also had an impact on the ﬁrms' behavior.
In a more recent contribution to the literature, Ferraro and Uchida (2007)
analyze stock market reactions after the ﬁrst publication of the Japanese PRTR.
Withal they could not identify signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns, also when
restricting to the top 50 polluters regarding total emissions. Hence, they reject
the hypothesis of negative abnormal returns as a reaction to the publication of
the Japanese PRTR. The authors explain the diﬀerences as opposed to the TRI
with a lack of media presence as well as the absence of public pressure, normally
created by NGOs. It can be summarized that the success of the TRI is not easily
transferable to other countries due to diﬀerences in institutions, cultural norms
and interests.
Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008) analyze the ef-
fectiveness of the Spanish EPER. As in our paper, they use a MVRM to estimate
the abnormal returns. According to their estimations, the information provided
in the EPER has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the listed ﬁrm's market value.
Furthermore, they ﬁnd evidence that companies with higher emissions show also
higher signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns. As explanation the authors suppose,
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Table 1: Event studies of PRTRs
Authors Register Year
(Disclosure)
Method Estimation
window
Event
window
Abnormal
returns
Hamilton (1995) TRI 1987 traditional (-115,-15) -1 0.001%
(USA) (1989) 0 -0.284%***
(0,5) -1.200%***
Konar and Cohen (1997) TRI 1987 traditional (-250,-10) -1 -0.033%
(USA) (1989) 0 -1.324%***
(0,5) -1.113%***
Khanna et al. (1998)1 TRI 1987 traditional (-110,-10) 0 -0.144%
(USA) (1989) 1 0.184%
(0,1) -0.329%
(0,5) -0.406%
Ferraro and Uchida (2007) PRTR 2001 traditional (-117,-18) 0 0.023%
(Japan) (2003) 1 -0.195%
(0,5) 2.069%***
Canon-de-Francia et al. (2008) EPER 2001 MVRM (-250,19) -1 -0.14%
(Spain) (2004) 0 0.26%
1 -0.28%***
(-1,+1) -0.16%
Note. Year reports the year in which the data was collected; year of data disclosure is given in parentheses.
Estimation window describes the interval at which the market model was calibrated.
Event window describes the interval or point in time for which abnormal returns were captured.
Points in time are given as days relative to the ﬁrst day of trading after the event occurred.
1 Khanna et al. (1998) only analyzed ﬁrms in the chemical industry; in the paper also the abnormal returns for the
reporting years 1988-1992 are available which are mostly signiﬁcant.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
that investors imply a lack of future competitiveness in contrast to companies with
lower emissions.
Table 1 summarizes the diﬀerent event studies that analyze stock market reac-
tions to the disclosure of emission registers.
3 Data and Empirical Speciﬁcation
3.1 Identiﬁcation of Abnormal Returns
We apply an event study to identify the inﬂuence of environmental information
on market value. This method has been established as the standard approach to
capture market reactions to events or publications (Binder, 1998). Identiﬁcation
rests on the assumption that stock price developments follow a market model.
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Given this assumption, systematic deviations from the normal price development
can be attributed to the event or information release occurring associated with this
day (Brown and Warner, 1980). Hamilton (1995) was one of the ﬁrst to stress that
this method, which originally stems from the ﬁeld of ﬁnance, is also suitable to
evaluate eﬀectiveness of regulatory instruments.
Identiﬁcation rests on the assumption of an eﬃcient market in the sense of
Fama (1970).3 Based on this assumption, share prices reﬂect the current value of
future cash ﬂows. Moreover, the observed return at day t of share i (Rit) consists
of an idiosyncratic part (αi), a part that hinges on the average market return (Rmt)
and a random error term with mean zero (uit).
Rit = αi + βiRmt + uit (1)
On the day of the event, we allow for abnormal returns that are captured by a
dummy variable D0t which takes the value of 1 on the day after publication of the
information. According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997), the eﬀect of the event
can also aﬀect days close to the event itself (while the applied time window should
not be too large to avoid the inﬂuence of disturbing eﬀects). Hence, to allow
information leaks on the day before as well as delayed information processing
on the day after, we include two more dummies D−1t and D1t that are set to 1
on the preceding and following day respectively. In doing so, the dummy variable
captures any signiﬁcant deviation on the respective day. Put diﬀerently, we extract
the systematic component of uit to restore a zero mean error term. A large number
of studies have been published based on this identiﬁcation strategy. Most early
studies used simple panel models with a ﬁrm independent dummy for abnormal
returns (e.g. D0), which is now known as the traditional approach. However, the
method has been reﬁned in the last years. In particular the work of Binder (1985)
has helped to establish the Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM): To allow
for heteroscedasticity across ﬁrms, the MVRM consists of n stacked equations,
according to the number of ﬁrms in the sample, with ﬁrm speciﬁc dummy variables,
yielding the following set of GLS equations:
3There are also alternative models for stock prices, e.g. the capital asset pricing model.
However, the chosen market model is still the most commonly used approach (see e.g. Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997; Binder, 1998).
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Table 2: Sample distribution by sectors
Sector NACE
Kode WZ
2003
Number of
ﬁrms in sample
Number of
facilities in
sample
2001 2004 2001 2004
Total amount 38 36 156 161
Food, drink and tobacco DA 5 4 21 12
Paper and print DE 1 1 6 4
Chemicals DG 9 10 35 32
Petrochemicals DH 1 0 2 0
Cement, glass and ceramics DI 6 5 12 19
Metallurgy and manufacturing of metal articles DJ 2 3 4 18
Mechanical engineering DK 1 1 2 1
Electrics and electronics DL 3 1 29 1
Vehicle manufacturing DM 4 5 7 18
Energy and water production and distribution EA 6 6 38 56
R1t = α1 + β1Rmt +
∑1
a=−1 γ1aDat + u1t
R2t = α2 + β2Rmt +
∑1
a=−1 γ2aDat + u2t
...
Rnt = αn + βnRmt +
∑1
a=−1 γnaDat + unt
(2)
We choose the same estimation time window as in Khanna, Quimio, and Bo-
jilova (1998), letting t run from 110 up to 10 trading days before the publication
of the EPER. For market values of the emitting ﬁrms we use ﬁrm i's daily closing
prices (Pit) at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Further, we use quotations of the
German Stock Index (DAX) as measure for the average market performance. To
get daily stock market returns on day t, we take diﬀerences of the corresponding
logged quotations.4
Rit = logPi,t − logPi,t−1 (3)
We restrict the sample to those ﬁrms listed on a German stock exchange5, with
4An alternative approach would be the calculation of the discrete return using Rit =
Pit−Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
= PitPi,t−1 − 1 which is, however, hardly used in event studies. Moreover, Henderson
(1990) points out that both approaches yield similar results.
5We use data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
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headquarters in Germany, which also appeared in the EPER. Further, it is impor-
tant to exclude confounding eﬀects like the declaration of dividends, release of a
new product, announcement of an impending merger, or of unexpected earnings
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The stock quotations are corrected for mergers,
dividends and splits. We checked for further events in the Lexis-Nexis database
and excluded those ﬁrms with potentially confounding events during the event
window, leaving us with 38 and 36 observations, in 2001 and 2004 respectively.
3.2 Drivers of Abnormal Returns
In a second step we want to identify drivers of the observed market reaction. There-
fore, we regress all signiﬁcant dummy coeﬃcients (γia) on the observed emission
levels and a set of additional regressors.
As our source of environmental information, we use data from the European
Pollutant Emission Register (EPER). European ﬁrms are obliged to report their
emissions of 50 diﬀerent pollutants whenever they exceed a certain threshold. Our
data contains two waves, 2001 and 2004. In 2001, a total number of 1863 sites
reported their emissions while in the second wave, 1686 facilities submitted the
respective values to the European authorities. The EPER provides information
on emissions in kilograms, reported for each plant and substance. Hence, we need
to do some transformations to receive a meaningful measure. First, we weigh the
emissions with the inverse of the reporting threshold to receive emission levels that
are comparable across substances (as suggested by King and Lenox, 2001).6 As
the data is given on plant level we also aggregate the data over all substances s
and all plants p to receive ﬁrms i's cumulative weighted emissions in year y (eiy)
ei,y =
∑
∀p
∑
∀s
ws ∗ epsi,y (4)
where ws represents the relative toxicity of the polluting substance s, and epsi,y
captures the emission of substance s on plant p for ﬁrm i in year y. Moreover,
we believe that carbon dioxide (CO2) represents a special case of a pollutant. As
6E.g., the threshold for CO2 emissions is 100,000,000 kg per year. As a consequence, the
corresponding weight is 1/100,000,000.
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a consequence, we capture (similarly weighted) emissions of this substance in the
variable CO2. We also control for size eﬀects. As production levels are not reported
in the German EPER, we use sales in year y (salesi,y) as a proxy. The sales data
is taken from the annual reports. When data was unavailable the respective ﬁrms
were dropped. To allow for industry eﬀects, we also include information on the
ﬁrm's sector, captured by the NACE code which is reported in EPER (see Table
2). We include a sector dummy for all sectors with at least two ﬁrms.
Summarizing, our equation for abnormal returns after the publication of the
ﬁrst wave of EPER data includes emissions levels (ei and COi), turnover level
(salesi), a dummy for environmental reports (ER) with interaction eﬀects and a
set of sector dummies (Ds).
ARia,2001 = ˆγia,2001 = β0+β1ei,2001+β2CO2i,2001+β3salesi,2001+β4ER+
∑
S
δsDs+µi
(5)
The abnormal returns on day a in year y stem from the previous regression
and are thus equal to ˆγia,y. In this regression, identiﬁcation requires the level of ei
to be informative to the market. However, it is possible that the market reactions
will include the expected value of ei in their former valuation of the ﬁrm. Hence,
only the diﬀerence between actual and expected emissions should be treated as
news. We can test this hypothesis using emissions levels of 2001 as a proxy for
expected emissions in 2004. Hence, we run the following regression where we take
diﬀerences of emissions and sales and keep the previous dummy variables to allow
for sector time trends.
ARia,2004 = ˆγia,2004 = β1∆ei+β2∆CO2i+β3∆salesi+β4ER+
∑
S
δsDs,y +µi (6)
where ∆ei = ei,2004 − ei,2001, ∆CO2i = CO2i,2004 − CO2i,2001 and ∆salesi =
salesi,2004 − salesi,2001.
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3.3 Research Hypotheses
The assumption of eﬃcient capital markets leads to the hypothesis that new, unex-
pected information may cause abnormal changes in the stock prices (Fama, Fisher,
Jensen, and Roll, 1969). In addition to this, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argue
that high pollutions of companies can be seen as ineﬃciencies and therefore lead to
a lack of innovation and competitiveness in the future - which is in turn reﬂected
in the current stock price of the ﬁrm. These processes were empirically veriﬁed
for example by Hamilton (1995). He points out, that the ﬁrst publication of the
TRI data led to negative abnormal returns of the listed ﬁrms. Canon-de-Francia,
Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008) conﬁrm this hypothesis for the Spanish
data of the EPER. Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) examine additional to
the ﬁrst publication following periods. They could verify that repeated disclosure
of environmental information leads to signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns, al-
though the reaction to the ﬁrst publication was not negative. Hence, we formulate
the following ﬁrst hypothesis for the German data of the EPER:
H1. The publication of the EPER produces negative abnormal returns in the
share price of listed ﬁrms.
Also, the pollution level has an inﬂuence on the perception of the competitive-
ness of ﬁrms. As Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy (1998) as well as Khanna, Quimio,
and Bojilova (1998) argue, the higher the pollutions the lower is the stream of
proﬁts that a ﬁrm is expected to earn in the future, which is represented by the
stock prices. Thus the costs of environmental liability for contamination caused
by emissions are uncertain, because there is uncertainty about the occurrence
of environmental damages of being held liable for those damages. Furthermore
Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008) show in their anal-
ysis of the EPER, that the negative abnormal returns are related to the relative
level of ﬁrms` emissions. Ajar to this result, the second hypothesis H2 states:
H2. The ﬁrst publication of the EPER induces greater negative abnormal re-
turns, the greater the level of (toxicity weighted) pollution.
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As mentioned above Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) analyze the repeat-
edly publication of environmental information through the TRI. They examine
that stakeholder used these information as a tool to benchmark the companies'
performance over several years. Hypothesis H3 is formulated out of this insight:
H3. Listed ﬁrms get punished with negative abnormal returns if their emissions
increase from 2001 to 2004 and rewarded with positive abnormal returns respec-
tively if their emissions decrease.
4 Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated abnormal returns for the Multivariate Regres-
sion Model (MVRM) as described in (2). As in Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe,
and Ramirez-Aleson (2008), we assign day 0 of the event to the ﬁrst day on which
the information on the new EPER data appeared in the press: Feb 24, 2004 and
Nov 24, 2006, respectively.7
Table 3: MVRM estimates for 2001
Day Date Average Abnormal Test Statistic
(a) Return (γˆa) H0:γa = 0
-1 02/23/2004 0.05% F(38,99)=0.80
0 02/24/2004 -0.07% F(38,99)=1.11
1 02/25/2004 -0.31% F(38,99)=1.92∗∗∗
Window Dates Average Abnormal Test Statistic
Returns (
∑
γˆa) H0:
∑
γa = 0
(-1,+1) 02/23/2004- -0.32% F(1,99)=0.19
02/25/2004
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In particular, we present four diﬀerent estimates for each year. First we es-
timated the abnormal returns on the three days of interest and, in addition to
7Note that this notation slightly diﬀers from the literature on the TRI, where day 0 marks
the day of the publication of the data.
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that, also test whether the cumulated abnormal returns are diﬀerent from zero.
The results show signiﬁcant abnormal returns which makes us accept H1 for both
waves.
Table 4: MVRM estimates for 2004
Day Date Average Abnormal Test Statistic
(a) Return (γˆa) H0:γa = 0
-1 11/23/2006 -0.33% F(36,99)=1.32
0 11/24/2006 -0.25% F(36,99)=2.57∗∗∗
1 11/27/2006 -0.61% F(36,99)=1.07
Window Dates Average Abnormal Test Statistic
Returns (
∑
γˆa) H0:
∑
γa = 0
(-1,+1) 11/23/2006- -1.20% F(1,99)=4.03∗∗
11/27/2006
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ Signiﬁcant at the 10/5/1% level.
Moreover, the results contain two additional eﬀects. First, in 2001, the eﬀects
are less strong and are insigniﬁcant in the three day interval. Second, market
reactions seem to be faster when the EPER data are published for the second time.
Summarizing, the second publication of EPER seems to have caused both more
immediate and more intense reactions. This ﬁnding is in line with the results of
Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) who report a similar eﬀect for the TRI. The
abnormal returns are, however, generally of slightly smaller size when compared
to their US counterparts.
Next, we test the second hypothesis and estimate equation (5) for the signiﬁcant
abnormal returns in each data wave. We test diﬀerent models. First, we restrict
the model to emissions only, separated into CO2 and the remaining substances
(ei). Then, we subsequently add salesi, sector dummies (Sectors), a dummy
for environmental reports (ER) and its interaction eﬀects with emissions. The
richest model has the highest explanatory power and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for
the reported level of emissions (see table 5). The interaction term of emissions
with the provision of environmental reports is highly signiﬁcant, meaning that the
eﬀect of the public register is diﬀerent for ﬁrms that provide voluntary reporting. In
fact, we see that for these ﬁrms the emissions reported in EPER do no longer aﬀect
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abnormal returns (F-test, F(1,9)=3.31, p>0.10). With respect to CO2 emissions,
our results suggest that they are not necessarily a bad signal for the market. With
the introduction of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), ﬁrms were
endowed with large numbers of certiﬁcates. The market for carbon thus might serve
as destigmatization while at the same time it does not lead to high costs for the
ﬁrms. We cannot rule out, however, that CO2 partially captures production size
and thus might lead to a biased estimate. In fact, the insigniﬁcance of sales, our
intended proxy for size, even supports this view. Summarizing, we can conﬁrmH2,
but only for pollutants other than CO2, and only for ﬁrms that had not provided
an environmental report before.
In a last step, we check H3 and estimate equation (6). The results point in a
similar direction as the previous ﬁndings. Apart from CO2, emissions induce neg-
ative abnormal returns if ﬁrms do not provide environmental reports themselves
(see Table 6). For ﬁrms that do provide these reports, the eﬀect of the change in
EPER emissions, measured as the sum of the two relevant coeﬃcients, looses sig-
niﬁcance (F-test, F(1,8)=4.47, p>0.05). Hence, corporate environmental reports
seem to serve as a substitute for the public pollutant register, neutralizing the
eﬀect of the latter. In the case of CO2, we see a positive impact, independent of
environmental reports. This hints to a special role of CO2 in this context. Again,
however, the interpretation of this coeﬃcient should be treated with care. Given
the lack of signiﬁcance of sales, CO2 might simply pick up variation in the produc-
tion levels. In summary, we conditionally accept H3 for all non-carbon emissions
and ﬁrms without additional voluntary environmental reporting.
4.1 Robustness Checks
While most event studies just report a single estimation window - often without
further justiﬁcation - we oﬀer an innovative robustness check. We systematically
vary the window size and thus provide a much broader set of estimates. In Tables
7 and 8 in the appendix, we provide the p-values for estimation windows from 50
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Table 5: Drivers of the abnormal returns (2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ei -1.00 -1.04
∗ -3.670∗∗ -4.28∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.096) (0.028) (0.000)
CO2 2.73 2.26 3.85 5.99
(0.403) (0.305) (0.451) (0.729)
salesi 1.21 3.29 -2.03
(0.792) (0.629) (0.574)
ei ∗ ER 11.10∗∗
(0.016)
CO2 ∗ ER -14.60
(0.470)
ER 0.002
(0.787)
Sectors no no yes yes
Constant -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.0004
(0.417) (0.458) (0.708) (0.958)
R-squared 0.0076 0.0080 0.2533 0.3256
N 38 38 38 38
Note. Dependent variable is gamma =1,2001.
Standard errors clustered at sector level; p-values are in parentheses.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1/5/10% level.
to 250 days before the event occurred. The picture strengthens the impression that
the eﬀect of the ﬁrst publication of EPER is less robust than the second publication
which survives all window sizes. Moreover, it demonstrates the limitations of event
studies, as for too small estimation windows, we get signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for
nearly all days observed.
In a second robustness check, we studied a possible extension to the market
model in (1), allowing the oil price to matter for stock market quotations. The
results do not change substantially, the main results survive. Further, we re-
estimated equations (5) and (6) for each sector separately which also yielded similar
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Table 6: Explaining abnormal returns by changes in emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ei 1.40
∗∗ 1.34∗ 2.50∗∗∗ -12.75∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.082) (0.000) (0.008)
∆CO2 13.60 19.30 19.20 25.01∗∗∗
(0.510) (0.471) (0.101) (0.003)
∆salesi -1.26 -1.96
∗ -2.15
(0.361) (0.091) (0.176)
∆ei ∗ ER 13.07∗∗∗
(0.008)
∆CO2 ∗ ER -6.74
(0.748)
ER 0.003
(0.591)
Sectors no no yes yes
Constant -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.004 -0.0004
(0.978) (0.952) (0.551) (0.568)
R-squared 0.0286 0.0318 0.5132 0.6009
N 32 32 32 32
Note. Dependent variable is γ0,2004.
Standard errors clustered at sector level; p-values are in parentheses.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1/5/10% level.
results.
5 Conclusion
Our results provide new insights into the eﬀects of the public provision of environ-
mental information. In particular, we can present evidence that a pollutant release
and transfers register still matters today - even in countries with high levels of en-
vironmental regulation. Further, our data show that carbon emissions are treated
diﬀerently by the stock market, suggesting that the installation of a market for
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emission allowances, like the EU-ETS for carbon, might crowd out public interest
in the traded good. Moreover, we could show that environmental reports can serve
as a substitute for the public register. If ﬁrms voluntarily provide such reports,
changes in emission levels published in EPER can no longer explain abnormal re-
turns. This suggests that the information provided in environmental reports was
seen to be suﬃcient by investors, thereby reducing the impact of the public reg-
ister. In summary, however, EPER seems to be an eﬀective instrument. In 2007,
EPER was replaced by a new European register, E-PRTR, which provides yearly
reports and covers an extended number of ﬁrms and pollutants, thereby oﬀering
further research opportunities.
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A Appendix: Robustness check data
Table 7: Abnormal returns in 2001, p-values
γ−1,2001 γ0,2001 γ1,2001
∑1
−1 γ−1,2001
(-50,-10) 1.20e-08 4.48e-08 8.54e-09 .450891
(-60,-10) 2.02e-11 1.91e-12 1.13e-23 .6072292
(-70,-10) .0598362 .0145771 9.09e-11 .8909603
(-80,-10) .2091059 .0389231 2.53e-07 .827836
(-90,-10) .6356966 .2116899 2.98e-07 .8340944
(-100,-10) .6644117 .2329448 .000049 .8055787
(-110,-10) .8171702 .3487436 .0018378 .6793579
(-120,-10) .8006431 .6225821 .0194071 .6983867
(-130,-10) .7735217 .7973409 .0501972 .6497523
(-140,-10) .8672028 .7348984 .0522307 .6006724
(-150,-10) .8252246 .760308 .0676052 .5960792
(-160,-10) .8127792 .8655134 .0538861 .57134
(-170,-10) .8079769 .8726592 .0848965 .5690038
(-180,-10) .8289992 .8966409 .1334073 .5646787
(-190,-10) .8760175 .8739314 .1107719 .5396393
(-200,-10) .8725137 .9215527 .2273415 .5416952
(-210,-10) .9221516 .9234356 .2963669 .5429159
(-220,-10) .9380672 .9402381 .2968925 .5075682
(-230,-10) .9517484 .942132 .281509 .6508514
(-240,-10) .9543974 .93439 .2974297 .6666317
(-250,-10) .9603083 .94337 .2749454 .6629117
Note. First column contains estimation window. The subsequent columns contain
p-values for the hypothesis that the estimated abnormal returns are equal to zero.
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Table 8: Abnormal returns in 2004, p-values
γ−1,2004 γ0,2004 γ1,2004
∑1
−1 γ−1,2004
(-50,-10) 4.68e-10 3.82e-21 1.20e-17 .0037918
(-60,-10) 1.01e-06 8.35e-10 7.54e-08 .0109501
(-70,-10) 7.59e-06 1.03e-06 .0000337 .0089519
(-80,-10) .0029411 .0001041 .0014542 .0028617
(-90,-10) .0029411 .0001041 .0014542 .0028617
(-100,-10) .215067 .0001686 .0066541 .0204713
(-110,-10) .1697567 .0001705 .0288917 .0566581
(-120,-10) .2087325 .0004199 .0729503 .1165944
(-130,-10) .2792337 .0017748 .0863231 .2127319
(-140,-10) .3585194 .0067394 .110714 .4991585
(-150,-10) .317761 .0069464 .1992936 .4636408
(-160,-10) .4500583 .0148086 .2324958 .4260968
(-170,-10) .7002058 .0166454 .214616 .3945487
(-180,-10) .8081755 .0192828 .3716203 .3730198
(-190,-10) .8403016 .0252759 .3647323 .366814
(-200,-10) .8293191 .0734079 .3633097 .3267645
(-210,-10) .8298257 .0485298 .347829 .3144028
(-220,-10) .8422295 .0342808 .4143885 .2982365
(-230,-10) .9001778 .0320569 .3680477 .2770736
(-240,-10) .9128671 .0282849 .3444621 .2757701
(-250,-10) .8984343 .022841 .3017932 .2722521
Note. First column contains estimation window. The subsequent columns contain
p-values for the hypothesis that the estimated abnormal returns are equal to zero.
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